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DESIGN IN NATURE.
At a meeting of a scientific club lately, a discussion
was held on the subject : "Is evolution directed by in-
telligence ? " This question touches the very heart
of religion and science ; and we cannot shirk it if we
desire to attain to any clearness and comprehensive-
ness of view concerning the most vital problems of
human existence.
Before we can answer the question proposed, we
must first ask what do we understand by intelligence.
We must analyze its meaning and separate it into the
elements of which it consists.
Intelligence comprises two elements : (i) We mean
by intelligence design, plan, order, harmony, con-
formit}' to law, or Gesetzmdssigkeit ; and (2) when
speaking of intelligence we think that there is attached
to it the element of feeling or consciousness.
Feeling by itself has nothing to do with intelli-
gence
;
yet consciousness has : consciousness is in-
telligent feeling. A single feeling, a pain or a pleas-
ure, as long as it remains isolated cannot be called in-
telligent
;
yet it acquires a meaning as soon as it re-
fers to one or several other feelings. For thus feelings
become representations of the surrounding conditions
that produce feelings. Consciousness is nothing but
a co-ordination of many feelings into one harmonious
state. Beings in possession of conscious intelligence
we call persons.
Now we ask. Can there be design which is not con-
nected with feeling? Can there be order or plan with-
out a conscious being who made the plan? We say,
Yes.
The crystallization of a snowflake is made with
wonderful exactness, in agreement with mathematical
law. Is this formation of snow-crystal manufactured
with purposive will, by a personal being ? A mathe-
matician knows that the regularity of forms necessarily
depends upon the laws of form, upon the same in-
trinsic order which is present in the multiplication
table; it depends upon the arithmetical relations among
the numbers.
Is a personal intelligence necessary for creating
the laws that produce the harmony of arithmetical
proportions ? Is a personal intelligence necessary for
making the angles of equilateral triangles equal ? Cer-
tainly it is not.
Suppose that some substance crystallizes at a given
angle. Necessarily it will form regular figures shaped
according to some special plan.
Suppose again that certain cells of organized sub-
stance, plant-cells or animal-cells, perform special
functions, will they not in their growth exhibit a cer-
tain plan in conformity to their nature not otherwise
than a crystal ? They will, or rather they must ; or
can we believe that the interference of personal in-
telligence is necessary to apply the plan to the growth
of organized substance? Organization is so to say
crystallization of living substance ; it is growth in con-
formity to law.
The growth of a child takes place unconsciously,
not otherwise than the growth of a flower. The con-
sciousness developed in the former is the product,
not the condition of its development ; it is the product
of organization. The consciousness of man is the
highest kind of systematic co-ordination of feeling that
we know of, and therefore we say that he is endowed
with intelligence. Man is a person.
Personality is not the annihilation of the mechan-
ical law
;
yet through the introduction of feeling the
mechanical law that governs the changes and innumer-
able adaptations of a person, becomes so complex that
it at first sight appears to us as an annihilation of the
mechanical law.
The hypothesis of a personal intelligence is not
needed to explain either the design of nature, or the
plan of evolution, or the gradual development of na-
tions and individuals, which processes are all in rigid
conformity to law. At the bottom of all cosmic order
lies the order of mathematics, the law that twice two
is always four.
Personal interference is so little necessary to pro-
duce regularity according to some design with any
exactness, that it would even make it all but im-
possible. If man desires the execution of some work
with minute exactness, he has to invent a machine to
do the work. A machine performs its work with rigid
immutability. And a machine, what is it but an unfeel-
ing and an unconscious,—a mechanical,—intelligence?
Personality, what is it but the power of constantlj'
renewed adaptation? Personality, therefore means
mutability.
Suppose a book were written and not printed ; sup-
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pose it were produced by the conscious intelligence of
a personal being, and not mechanically by a machine ;
could we expect the same minute exactness ? As-
suredly not. It would be witchery to adapt anything
in close and rigid conformity to law, without machine-
like unconscious intelligence.
Suppose that the planets were run by some per-
sonal being ; that they were constantly watched with
conscious wisdom and regulated by purposive adjust-
ment ; we could not trust our safet}' a moment on this
planet. Mechanical regularity in minutest details is
all but impossible in the work of personal intelligence.
*
* *
A machine has no feeling and possesses no con-
scious intelligence
;
yet a machine must have been in-
vented by a conscious and premeditating intelligence.
A machine proves the presence of a designing person
somewhere. And the question arises : Could not the
Cosmos be considered as a machine invented by a great
and divine person, designed for some preconceived
end ?
Even though there were no objections to this rather
child-like and antiquated anthropomorphism, this con-
ception of things would be of no use towards explain-
ing the cosmic order. A machine is not invented by
an inventor as a fairy-tale is conceived by a poet. A
machine can work only if it conforms to that imper-
sonal intelligence which we call mathematical neces-
sity. It is the latter that makes the machine useful,
and it is the latter that has to be explained.
If God made the world as an inventor makes a ma-
chine, he had to obey the laws of nature and to adapt
his creations to the formulas of mathematics. In that
case, however, the Creator would not be the omnipo-
tent and supreme God; there would still be an imper-
sonal Deity above him. In that case the Creator would
be no less subject to the cosmic order than we poor
mortals are.
Show me by any convincing argument that the
cosmic order represented in so simple a statement as
"twice two is four" had to be created arbitrarily by
some conscious intelligence, and I shall willingly and
without hesitation return to the anthropomorphic be-
lief in a personal God—a belief which was so dear to
me in my early youth. Yet so long as the cosmic or-
der must be recognized as uncreated and uncreatable,
as omnipresent and eternal, as omnipotent and irref-
ragable, we must consider the worship of a personal
God as pure idolatry.
*
* *
But this solution of the problem—is it not dreary
atheism ? It is not, or it is—according to our ability
to receive the message of the necessity, the irrefraga-
bility of the Formal Law.
Our theologians maintain that the order of the
cosmos proves the existence of a deity. I maintain
that it does more : The order of the Cosmos is itself
divine. It does not prove that there is a God outside
the universe who made the cosmic order ; it proves the
presence of a God inside.
Is the order of the Cosmos void of intelligence? It
is without feeling, but surely not without plan or de-
sign. The laws of nature represent design ; they are
embodied design. The law of gravitation, for in-
stance, does not act with consciousness, yet it rep-
resents order. It describes the regularity of the fall
of a stone as well as of all the motions of the heavenly
bodies in their wonderful order.
The immutability of the cosmic order disproves
a supernatural God, but it proves an immanent God.
And this God cannot be a person. He is more than
a person. God is called in the Old Testament the
Eternal, he is represented as immutable. Can a per-
son be immutable ? Is not" personality embodied mu-
tability, is it not adaptability to circumstances ? The
divine order of the Cosmos as represented in Natural
Laws stands above all mutability—unchangeable, in-
adaptable, eternal.
*
'
*
This God, the immutability of impersonal, or rather
of superpersonal intelligence, is the condition of science
and the basis of ethics. If natural laws were personal
inventions which could be changed at the pleasure of
their inventor, science would become impossible, and
morality would become an illusion. What is morality
but our effort to conform to the order of nature, and
above all, to the laws that shape society ?
This impersonal intelligence is higher than person-
al intelligence, as much so as the laws of a country are
infinitely higher and holier than all its citizens, its
princes and kings not excepted. There is a rule in
monarchies that the sovereign stands above the law.
Is it necessary to explain that this idea is a farce, an
illusion, a felony against the sanctity of the law? Sim-
ilarly, the idea of a God, fashioned according to the
personality of man, is a blasphemy of the higher God,
of that God who alone is God, of the Deity that pass-
eth all understanding, /. c, all conscious reasoning and
personal wisdom.
The worship of a personal God is the last remnant
of paganism. Our religious convictions can and will
not be purified until we apperceive a glimpse of the
grandeur of a higher view.
There is a superhuman Deity, whose glory the
heavens declare, and the firmament showeth his handi-
work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night un-
to night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor
language where their voice is not heard. The whole
Cosmos is permeated by eternal and divine law, by in-
telligence, by design.
J
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The whole world is a glorious revelation of its im-
manent God. Yet this revelation is concentrated in
man's personality. He possesses, not only a conscious
intelligence reflecting in his soul the divinity of the
All, but also the aspiration of moral ideals inspiring
him to conform to the cosmic order that rules supreme
from Eternity to Eternity.
THE HIDDEN SELF.
BY ALICE BODINGTON,
Innumerable experiments by various psychologists
appear to show that in cases of anaesthesia of one hand
or of part of the body ; of suggested blindness with
regard to certain objects, the second self is conscious
precisely where the first self is blind, deaf, or uncon-
scious of feeling. Many curious experiments are given
in "The Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Re-
search," for January, of which I will give one. The sub-
ject—not hypnotized—had a pencil put in his anaes-
thetic hand, hidden from his view by a screen. Many
pricks were given to this hand, without the least atten-
tion being paid by the subject. The left hand, however,
being gently pricked elicited an expression of pain
and "What did you do that for?" " Oh to see if you
were asleep," was the reply. The anaesthetic hand was
then urged to write, and did write, to this curious ef-
fect, " You pricked me fourteen times with a (here
followed a rude representation of a pin) and you ex-
pect me to write for you."* M. Janet believes that
the various phenomena observed in planchette writing,
table rapping, etc., need neither be ascribed to im-
posture on the one hand, nor to the influence of spirits
on the other ; that the writing of the planchette, and the
rappings of tables may both convey statements which
cause genuine surprise to the ' conscious selves' of
the experimenters, and that they really represent ex-
pressions of opinion by the 'sub-conscious selves.'
Often the medium when of a caractere serieux, is ex-
tremely indignant at the indiscretions and follies of
the planchette writer. My character cannot change
in this sudden way, says the unfortunate medium
scandalized at signing himself "Pompon la Joie," an
individual whose written pleasantries were more than
doubtful. Or the planchette self will suddenly be-
come tired and write, "It is time to go to sleep, go to
bed," after which no more communications are to be
obtained. M. Janet truly remarks that if the spirits
of the dead were the real authors of the commonplace
remarks, or of the nonsensical or superstitious utter-
ances attributed to them in spiritualistic stances, "Ce
serait vraiment renoncer a la vie future, s'il fallait la
passer avec des individus de ce genre." Corneille, he
says, through the lips of a medium makes bad verses,
* My copy of the Proceedings i
to write from memory.
where to be found, and I am compelled
and Bossuet signs sermons of which a village cur6
would be ashamed.*
M. Janet had some curious experiences with regard
to blisters caused by suggestion. One of his patients.
Rose, had hysterical cramps of the stomach. M. Janet
told her he would apply a blister to the affected part.
Some hours later the effects of the imaginary blister
appeared, the skin was dark red and puffed up. But
strange to say the mark had as it were four corners
cut off. M. Janet remarked to Rose that her blister
had a strange shape. "Don't you know," was the
answer, "that the corners are always cut off the 'pa-
piers Rigollot ' so that they should not hurt." Her
preconceived idea of the form of the blister had thus
determined the form and dimensions of the red patch.
On another occasion the suggestion was made that
the blister should take the form of a six-rayed star,
and the red mark took precisely this form. L^onie
had a suggested blister of the shape of an S on her
chest. All these imaginary blisters were successful
in curing the hysterical pains of the respective pa-
tients. Rose, who suffered severely from haemorrhage,
said that she had formerly been benefited by ergotine.*
M. Janet suggested that she should take a certain
number of doses of this drug at stated times. Subse-
quently every two hours Rose went through all the
forms of taking medicine from a spoon, persistently
maintaining that she was doing nothing, and the most
curious fact remains to be told, that the imaginary
medicine cured the real disease. In numberless in-
stances where the ' second self ' is carrying out actions
suggested during hypnotism, the '.first self' though
wide awake is quite unconscious of these actions.
Suggestions unrecalled are sometimes productive of
embarrassing or inconvenient effects, f Some one out
of mischief suggested to a patient that she should kiss
the almoner of the hospital when she awoke. This
suggestion was a constant source of worry to the un-
fortunate patient, who felt impelled to kiss the re-
spectable almoner, yet at the same time seems to have
felt the impropriety of the act. Nor could any one
remove the impression. A patient N. . . who nick-
named herself Ninute, on one occasion remained re-
fractory to everything M. Janet could suggest to her
in the waking state, and to a lesser degree when hyp-
notized. She appeared to hear with difficulty, and to
understand only with great effort. J "What is the
matter with you?" at last said M. Janet. "I do
not hear you ; I am too far off." "And where are
you?" "I am in Algiers, in the grand square." It
was not difficult then to bring the patient back from
her imaginary journey. When she considered she
had returned to France, she gave a sigh of relief, and
* VAutoiitatisme Psychologique, Part II, Chap, ii, iii., Risume histariqu*
du Spiritisittc.
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began to talk as usual. "Now will you explain " said
M. Janet, " what you were doing in Algiers?" "It
is'nt my fault; it was M. X., who sent ine there a
month ago ; he forgot to bring me back ; he left me
there. When you spoke and told me to raise my arm,
I could'nt obey, I was too far off." This statement
proved true so far that the patient had been sent to
Algiers by suggestion, and the suggestion had never
been recalled. The cases where the second (or one
of the subordinate selves) is superior in intelligence
to the conscious ego; and those where the two selves
act at the same time—as with ' L^onie ' and ' Ldontine '
seem to me inexplicable in the present state of our
knowledge. But that every portion of the spinal cord
and brain in ascending order should have a conscious-
ness of its own seems only natural if the history of the
individual is an epitome of the history of the race.
That ontogeny is an invaluable guide to phylogeny is
a fundamental axiom in biology.
It follows from this well-established fact that the
spinal cord, and the various portions of the brain in
ascending importance, have at different periods in the
past history of the race represented each the "Ego "
—
such as it was. In the Acrania, (of which the Am-
phioxus is the sole living representative), all functions
necessary for the preservation of life have been car-
ried out by the spinal cord* alone. In Amphioxus the
upper portion of the notochord functions as a rudi-
mentary brain, sending off nerves to a pair of rudi-
mentary eyes, and another branch to a ciliated pit,
possibly representing an olfactory organ.
From Amphioxus onwards, we find a constant in-
crease in complexity of structure and variety of func-
tion in the spinal cord and brain. Fresh parts are
literally added on, but through all the stages of pro-
gress the "ontogenetic stages find their exact parallel
in the phylogenetic development of vertebrates,
"f In
the monkey anterior parts of the brain are found which
are not yet developed in the dog ; in man are devel-
oped frontal portions of the cerebral hemispheres
which do not exist in the monkey. My theory is, that
all parts of the spinal cord and brain retain by atavism
the consciousnesses, from the lowest to the highest
forms, which each possessed when it functioned as
the ruling nerve-centre for the time being ; and that
each and all of these subconsciousnesses are, in a
condition of health, subordinated to the highest cer-
ebral centres, and each and all are carrying on nat-
ural and acquired reflex actions and thus leaving the
superior ego free to carry on its own special work. Not
only this. It appears to me that these subordinate
portions of the brain and spinal cord have all shared
* In its primitive condition as the notochord ; a stage passed through in
the embryonic state by the higher vertebrates, but persisting through life in
ome of the lower forms.
+ Wiedersheini, "Comparative Anatomy of Vertebrates."
in the development of the highest centres. The am-
phioxus and the brainless frog for instance, are placed
under the same conditions, but the spinal cord and
medulla of the brainless frog control an immense
number of muscles and nerves which do not exist in
the low fish ; the spinal cord of the frog has been far
more highly " educated " than the notochord of the
fish. It is by this hypothesis that I would explain the
power of articulate speech, and even of acquiring lan-
guages possessed by the subconscious centres, when
the ordinary ego is to all intents and purposes, tem-
porarily non-existent. A case came to my own knowl-
edge of a lady who, deeply under the influence of
chloroform, replied in French to a question addressed
by the French governess to her husband ; the gov-
erness being outside the door, and the door closed.
The same lady startled the household with a violent
scream, when a case full of books fell in the night
;
and then enquired what was the matter, who screamed,
and why people had come running into her room. In
both these cases whilst the dominant self was uncon-
scious, the subconscious self was awake and equal to
the occasion.
THE ETHICAL PLOBLEM.
A REJOINDER.
BY W, M, SALTER.
Nothing but extreme preoccupation has hindereti my noticing
earlier Dr. Carus's replies to my comments on his book ( Thf Ethical
Problem). I do not doubt his sincerity in wishing to come to an
understanding, and with this desire in my own mind I offer the fol-
lowing remarks.
Dr. Carus says that the Ethical teachers agree that what he
calls the basis of ethics is not needed. Now all that we are agreed
about is that such a basis is not to be laid down as a necessary part
of the Ethical movement—as something to which all members of
the movement pledge themselves. But any individual in the move-
ment can hold to such a basis, can feel the need of it and even
maintain that without it there can be no rational ethics. This
opinion may be held ; the only requirement is that there shall be
tolerance of other opinions. It one does not feel that he can be-
long to a society with others who think differently (whether as to
the specific basis or as to the need of a basis in general) he of course
leaves the society—or does not join it in the first place. For ex-
ample, I myself believe that a true world-conception is of great
importance, though I could not call it " a basis of ethics," as Dr.
Carus does ; I am in search of such a conception, and what
elements of it I have already gained, those who hear me know ;
but I can respect others who are following different lines from my
own and am glad to call them my brothers in an ethical fellowship.
Dr. Carus says that the Ethical lectures do not acknowledge
the ' reason why,' presented by orthodox theology. By this ' reason
why ' he means the will of God. But any of us might regard what-
ever is right as the will of God, if he chose to. The opinion of
any member to this effect we should have no right to challenge.
Basing the right on the will of God is, however, another matter ;
and I think Dr. Carus is unjust to orthodox theology in assuming
that it does so. Many are the theologians who regard God's will
as identical with what is right ; the few are those who regard God's
will as the author of it. Can Dr. Carus instance another theologian
of repute, besides Dymond, who did so ? There may, of course,
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be others, but I do not happen to know of them. But even so ex-
treme an opinion we should not have the right to exclude, so long
as it did not injuriously influence actual conduct*
Hence my own controversy with Dr. Carus will be hereafter
purely in my personal capacity. It would be thoughtlessness and ar-
rogance for me to allow all the windings, questionings, hesitancies,
affirmations of my own mind in a controversy like the present one
to be regarded as representative of the Ethical movement. In
speaking of the aim and nature of the Ethical fellowship, I do
speak for the movement and am answerable to it ; but in discuss-
ing questions of Ethical philosophy I speak solely for myself and
am answerable to no one.
Dr. Carus says that I know no ' reason why ' for my moral
law (as he is pleased to term it), and that I imagine that to give a
reason why "would be not to explain but to degrade morality."
With all wish to be charitable, I cannot acquit Dr. Carus of a mis-
use of my language in this connection. A 'reason why' in the
sense of an ultimate standard of right and wrong I have expressly
admitted to be necessary. But after the standard has been found
and, by the use of it, the right in a concrete case determined, the
question is sometimes asked, why should we do the right, which is
equivalent to asking why should our will be regulated by any
' ought ' whatever ? My answer was that we should do the right
out of reverence for the right and it appears to me that Dr. Carus's
language implied the same view. ' Reason why ' is ambiguous
;
it may refer to standard and it may refer to motive. A motive is
always, in one sense, a reason, but in a very different sense from
that in which a standard is a reason. A motive is a feeling, a de-
sire ; a standard is an object of thought. Now there is what I call
a properly moral motive—the desire to do what is right or to live
in harmony with one's reason or to obey one's highest thought
;
these are but different expressions for the same feeling. In its full-
ness the moral motive is beautifully expressed by George EHot, in
her description of Dorothea (mMidii/fmnyc/i): ' ' She yearned toward
the perfect right, that it might make a throne within her and rule
her errant will." Asking for another motive beyond the moral
motive practically means, what shall I gain by right action, what
selfish advantage shall I have from it ?—but action under such
motives is not moral action at all, and appealing to such motives
(i. e., furnishing such reasons) is not explaining morality, but de-
grading it. Hence Dr. Carus's language as to my ' mysticism ' is
wide of the mark. He thinks that like other enthusiasts, I regard
" science and all close scrutiny with suspicion," and that " the re-
lentless dissections of an exact analysis appear as a sacrilege." I
am actually amused at these words ; for it is just the absence of
close scrutiny into his ideas and exact analysis of them that I
thought I observed in Dr. Carus. The clear distinction of things
that differ, the avoidance of vague and ambiguous language are
surely the first (or at least an indispensable) step towards the
scientific understanding of any subject.
This inexactness still appears in Dr. Carus's use of the term
"Intuitionalism." " This view, " he says, " if it means anything,
means that the moral command comes to us in some unaccountable
way, mysteriously and directly from some sphere beyond." Not so.
Intuitionalism, as used by Professor Sidgwick (to whom Dr. Carus
refers and than whom there is no better authority) does not refer to
* Dr. Carus thinks that our societies should be called "Societies for Moral
Culture." I have sometimes thought that I should myself prefer such a
designation, simply because it sounds less technical. But Dr. Carus's dis-
tinction between morals and ethics appears to nie arbitrary ; no unthinking,
conventional, or merely reflex action can properly be called moral. Again,
Dr. Carus sees no need tor our leaving the churches, in case it is duty simply
that we are concerned for, since the churches also are concerned for the same
thing. But is not Dr. Carus aware that almost no Christian church would re-
ceive a person to membership on the strength of a moral aim and purpose
alone, that besides this, requirement is made of a confession in some theolog-
ical creed '
the source of the moral command at all, but to the immediate way
in which we are supposed to know that certain things are duties.
The obligation, to tell the truth, for example, is regarded by In-
tuitionalists as a matter of direct perception, not as an inference
or deduction from some other obligation. Intuitionalism is not
necessarily theological or supernaturalistic ; and on the other hand
utilitarianism even egoistic utilitarianism may be supernaturalistic,
as it was in the bands of Paley
.
Yes, the evolutionary theory of Dr.
Carus, if we give this name to the view that progress, and not
happiness, is the supreme end, is just as capable of being ultimately
interpreted in a theological or supernaturalistic manner ; the rule,
work for progress, for the development of human-soul life, may
be interpreted as a Divine command as readily as any other rule.
In fact, almost all the Ethical themes maybe " intuitionalist " in
Dr. Carus's vague use of the term.
As to the distinction between Utilitarianism and Hedonism, I
acknowledge that Dr. Carus has the right to make it, if etymology
and not scientific usage are to determine such matters. The use-
ful and the pleasant are certainly two distinct conceptions. Utili-
tarianism has always said that the useful was determined by its re-
lation to the pleasant ; but abstractly speaking, anything is useful,
which serves an end, whatever that end may be. I have not called
myself a Utilitarian, but I have been accustomed to say that I
sympathized with Utilitarianism so far as it opposed the claim of
Intuitionalists to settle special duties by means of ready-made in-
tuitions ; but not in so far as it made happiness or pleasure(whether
individual or general) the final end. Practically, as I think Mr.
Hegeler was aware, I regard progress as a better standard than
happiness. Whether it be an ultimate standard is another ques-
tion, and I think it can hardly be that, since progress (if it be more
than mere movement) implies some idea of a goal in the direction
of which progress takes place. Utilitarianism, however, as every
moral theory worthy of the name, distinguishes between moral
goodness and material usefulness. Only a theory which sunk ethics
to the level of mechanics would fail to do this. Bentham himself
says : " Beneficence apart from benevolence is no virtue ; it is not
moral quality—it belongs to a stock or stone, as well as to a hu-
man being."
Failure to think out the implications of what he says seems to
me to mark Dr. Carus's assertion that the stern facts of life leach
us what desires should be suppressed and what wishes should rule
supreme. I do not question the value of such experience as a
teacher—but all on one condition, namely, that we wish to live,
and more than that, that we wish others to live. Apart from such
a wish, immorality is as consistent with the " stern facts of life"
as morality. The fundamental problem of ethics is deeper than Dr.
Carus imagines; and it is because he does not seem to me to go to the
roots of things, that his ethics appear to be " something in the air."
So far as I can see, it is a purely hypothetical or conditional morality
that he gives us ; if, for example, we wish for health, he says in
substance we must regard the conditions of health—and aside
from such a wish obligation has no meaning. The facts are, of
course, the same whether we so wish or not ; I do not question that
many a "jovial companion" has been " buried in the bloom of
life." The real question is, was there any obligation upon such an
one to care for his life—not did he feel it or even could he be made
to feel it, but did it (the obligation) I'xisf ?
Dr. Carus does not make a careful statement of my views as
to the absoluteness of morality. I do not say that conscience is
absolute. It appears to me necessary to distinguish between con-
science and the moral law, just as we do between science and the
facts and laws of which science takes cognizance. I fully admit
the " facts of an erring conscience" to which Dr. Carus alludes.
So physical science has varied and often erred in the past ; but
we do not therefore conclude that there have been no unvarying
physical laws. Why is it not possible to allow that conscience is
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a development and by no means infallible, and yet hold that there
is an unvarying objective moral law ? The real absolute of moral-
ity is in the objective principles, not in conscience or the subjec-
tive sense of them. This I have brought out in the very lecture
from which Dr. Carus quotes, and which perhaps he had not time
to read to the end (vide pp. 94 to loi of Ethical Religion). Yet by
the moral law I have in mind something quite different from a
mere formulation of natural sequences (though I agree with Dr.
Carus in holding them to be necessary and unvarying) ; I mean a
commandment, a rule, an imperative—and the special moral rules
are so many applications of the fundamental rule to the various
special departments and situations of life. I have recently given
my views on the important distinction between physical law and
moral law in TJie Xe-c Ideal (Boston), June and October.
Dr. Carus recognizes the distinction between the leading
principle ;« ethics and the philosophical view i^rtrf r^ ethics. He
however holds that such a leading principle must be derived from
the philosophical view. This, so far as the words go, is perfectly
clear and consistent. But before I can be sure of what they mean,
I feel that I need an illustration of how the derivation takes place.
It was because I thought that Dr. Carus would give us such an
illustration that I took up " The Ethical Problem " with such in-
terest. I have already recorded my disappointment ; since not
only did he not derive his ethics from his " monism," but he
classed monism as one of the many "thought-constructions of
theorizing philosophers," to which it was not wise for an ethical
movement to commit itself. If then, as Dr. Carus says, " without
a world-conception we can have no ethics," it is di£ficult to avoid
the conclusion that be has not given us any ethics himself. Will
he not try to show in what way the principle of " truthfulness"
or that of " the development of human soul-life " is to be derived
from Monism—that is, in what way different from that in which
it could be derived from Theism or from Materialism ?
As to the "ethical stimulus" in ray own case, I have not the
slightest doubt, and acknowledge it reverently, that whatever I have
of it is largely due to the influences of home and of the religious
faith in which I was nurtured. But that faith did not include the
view that God was the author of right and wrong
;
and so when
my theistic confidence was disturbed, the foundations of morality
were not shaken. The Divine will was one with whatever was
right, according to my early teaching—and such a view made ,it
perhaps easier to do the right, just as it is often easier for a child
to do some task, if the parent askes it ; but duty was not made to
rest on the Divine will. At bottom the faith in which I was brought
up was an ethical faith (just as prophetic Judaism was an ethical
faith). I mean that it was a view of the universe dominated by
ethical elements. Apart from the idea of a just, righteous and
loving God, this view would have had little ethical value and im-'
parted little ethical stimulus. It was justice, righteousness, love
that had my central reverence, that have it still.
IN ANSWER TO MR. SALTER.
The basic difference between Mr. Salter's and our own posi-
tion will be pointed out in the Concluding Remarks to our dis-
cussion. I refrain here from answering Mr. Salter's reply in a
detailed exposition. Mr. Salter repeats his objections, and in or-
der to be explicit we should have to repeat the arguments set
forth in former articles. We shall confine ourselves to a few con-
cise remarks on six points:
i) We not only believe that 'a basis of ethics is needed,' but
also that it has to be laid down as a necessary part of any ethical
movement, that is started for preaching morals. No system of
morals can exist without a basis. And who will preach morals with-
out a clear and a systematic conception of ethics ?
2) Mr. Salter distinguishes between two theological concep-
tions the one "basing the right on the will of God ", the other re-
garding " God's will as identical with what is right." The distinc-
tion appears to us irrelevant, and has no connection with our
present discussion.
3) Mr. Salter accuses me of a misuse of his language where I
refer to his speaking of ' the reason why ' of the moral law.
After a careful consideration of the case, I find that the misrepre-
sentation of Mr. Salter's view is entirely due to a lack of clearness
on his part. The passage in question runs as follows :
" In fact, Dr, Carus gives no ' reason why ' in the sense of a motive be-
yond the moral motive ; and is well aware that to do so would be not to ex-
plain but to d3grade morality."
I interpreted this sentence in the light of another passage of
Mr. Salter's
:
" Who can give a reason for the supreme rule ? Indeed, no serious man
wants a reason."
Mr. Salter in his present article explains the passage under
consideration in the following way :
" A ' reason why' in the sense of an ultimate standard of right and wrong I
have expressly admitted to be necessary. But after the standard has been
formed. .. .the question is sometimes asked. Why should we do the right ?"
etc.
What Mr. Salter understands by this second Why, which rises
after the first Why has been settled, he explains in this way :
" Asking for another motive beyond the moral motive practically means :
What shall I gain by right action, what selfish advantage shall I have from it?"
We admit that to ask the question " What selfish advantage
shall I have from ethics ? " would not be to explain but to degrade
morality. But we must confess that this idea never occurred to
us. Thus in the passage under consideration, we had no idea
that Mr. Salter could understand by ' reason why ' an exclusively
egoistic motive. If he meant that, he should have said so. With
all due appreciation of Mr. Salter's charitableness, we do not feel
the need of it, because -we are confident that if there was any mis-
use of language, it was not made by us, and we are not to blame
for it.
Aside from the question of priority in the misuse of language,
the objection we have to make against Mr. Salter still holds
good, in so far ^s Mr. Salter maintains in other passages, especially
in his book, that there is no reason for the supreme rule in ethics.
He actually and repeatedly declines to derive the moral ought from
the facts of experience, and thus he imagines that that something
from which morality grows lies outside the pale of science.
We maintain that no standard is ultimate. Every standard
of right and wrong has to be derived from the facts of reality.
We investigate the laws of nature, of social development, of a
healthy evolution of the soul, and our standard of morality is
nothing more or less than conformity to these laws.
If the question is asked of a moral teacher, "Why should we
do the right," this in our mind can mean only, "Why should we
obey those rules which you lay down as right ?"
Mr. Salter says : " We should do the right out of reverence
for the right." Of course, we must have reverence for that which
we should do. That which we should do, must be regarded as
the highest we can think of. What we wish to do, must not be
suffered to be taken into consideration where it conflicts with that
which we should do. But considering the fact that we call that
which we should do " the right ", the j^rescript " to do the right
out of reverence for the right " appears from our standpoint, as
tautological.
4) I do not at all deny that the Intuitionalist considers conscience
as " a matter of direct perception"; yet at the same time I main-
tain that the Intuitionalist considers the moral sense, the ought,
duty, conscience, or whatever it may be called, as " a fundamental
notion, ultimate and unanalyzable ". This is the very e.\pression
of Professor Sidgwick. Science, it is supposed, cannot analyze
conscience, it cannot explain its origin, and thus its existence
must remain a mystery to us. See Professor Sidgwick's latest
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article on the subject, "Some Fundamental Ethical Controver-
sies " in Mind, October, i88g.
5) I read Mr. Salter's article " Obligation and the Sense of Ob-
ligation " in The New Ideal, where he compares duty with the phys-
ical law. Mr. Salter fails to make a distinction between the ob-
jective moral law in Nature, on the one hand, which is a physical
law as much as gravitation, and duty on the other hand ; the latter
being the subjective formulation of our obligation to conform to
the moral law. Mr. Salter says :
" Duty is like gravitation in that it is objective and yet unlike it, in that
it (duty; is an ideal, rule, or command, and not a necessarily acting force."
The question arises. What is objective and what is subjective
in duty. Mr. Salter says :
" The sense of obligation is just what appears to me to need to be clearly
distinguished from the reality ofobligation itself."*
This " reality of obligation itself " is an unclear idea
; yet I
find that it appears in Mr. Salter's book under different names
again and again. So long as Mr. Salter feels satisfied with this
idea, he will naturally think that the cause of all our differences lies
in a failure on my part to think out, as he says, the implications of
my assertion that ethics must be based on facts. Mr. Salter's
"reality of obligation itself" is a something that is not found
among and cannot be derived from facts, f
6) Mr. Salter again expresses his disappointment at my treat-
ment of the Ethical Problem. He says :
" Not only did lie not derive his ethics from his ' Monism ' but he classed
Monism as Dne of the many ' thought-constructions of theorizing philosoph-
ers to which it was not wi=e for an ethical movement to commit itself.''^
I have purposely avoided the terms " Positivism as well as
Monism " because it is not these particular " isms" we fight for,
but the ideas that generally go by these names. The word Mo-
nism can help nothing. It is not from a name that we expect sal-
vation.
It would be ridiculous to demand that our presentation of
Monism or of Positivism should be adopted either by the Ethical
Societies or by any one without critical examination. Accordingly
we class monism among those systems that have to be examined.
But we demand that certain truths be recognized which considered
as philosophical principles are generally known as positivism and
monism. Positive ethics I have briefly characterized as "the
principle of truthfulness." Truth is agreement with facts. We
must base our conduct unswervingly upon a correct conception of
facts. This implies on the one hand that we should shirk no effort,
trouble, or struggle to comprehend truth, and on the other hand
that we should never attempt to belie either ourselves or others.
The ethics of Monism urges us to heed the most important truth
in the realm of facts, namely, the oneness of all-existence. The ethics
of Monism teaches us to consider man as a part of the whole uni-
verse. The moral man aspires to conform to the All and to the
law'S of the All ; he longs to be one with the power in which we
live and move and have our being. In obedience to this impulse
man's soul grows ; it becomes more and more a microcosm within
the macrocosm. p. c.
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE DISCUSSION WITH
MR. SALTER.
Making a call of late on Mr. W. M. Salter, I enjoyed with
him a conversation, in which we tried to understand one another,
in order to arrive, if not at an agreement, yet at a clear statement
of our differences. Mr. Salter complained of my presentation of
the case, that I did not make distinctions which were necessary to
* The italics are Mr. Salter's own.
t For a further explanation see the end of the Concluding Remarks to our
i My answer to this objection is given in the article : ' The Moral Law
and Moral Rules." No. 164.
properly comprehend his position and that of the societies for
Ethical Culture. He did not object to ' 'a basis of ethics. " Whereupon
I said that the leaders of the Ethical Societies are perfectly right in
not wanting to pledge their members to any religious or philosophical
belief, yet they must themselves have a ground to stand on ; they
cannot preach ethics without a basis of ethics, for every ethical
rule is the e.xpression of a world-conception. By implication then,
an ethical movement after all rests on a philosophical basis.
On my saying that the ethics of a spiritualist, of a materialist,
of a believer in theism, of an Agnostic, of a Christian, a Jew, a Mo-
hammedan and a Buddhist, actually differ, and that they must
differ, Mr. Salter replied that " it was true, they might differ, but it
was very possible that iin Grossen unit Ganzcn they might agree.
We take exception to this. Even the different denominations
of the same religion, for instance Protestants and Catholics, have
different ethics. I do not deny that certain ethical rules are re-
garded as binding by all the religious teachers of the world
; there
is a "common conscience," (to use Prof.Adler's term,) developing
in mankind, but is not this common conscience, so far as it is not
a mere incidental concurrence, the expression of a common world-
conception ? A common world-conception (viz., a positivism or a
systematized statement of the facts, founded upon scientific inves-
tigation) is preparing itself in humanity and together with it we
can observe the evolution of the ethics of positivism, viz., of ethics
in agreement with facts, an ethics that can be analyzed and com-
prehended by science.
But this kind of ethics (positive ethics) is found insufficient
by Mr. Salter. He maintains that the ethical problem lies deeper
than scientific inquiry can reach. " Granted that the knowledge
of facts is the basis of ethics," he said, "there is a basis below
this basis. In studying facts, we are influenced by a purpose
;
we have some end in view, and we study facts and conditions in
order that we may know how we shall attain that end. The deeper
question is, then. What is the true end ? And the bottom obliga-
tion is to regard and seek this end, when it is once rationally de-
termined. What are our matter-of-fact wishes is a secondary
matter."
Before 'answering the question as to this so-called deeper ob-
ligation I would ask and answer another question. What is
meant by " obligation ? " Obligation is simply a statement of ours
;
it is the formulation of facts for special practical purposes, very
appropriately put in the shape of a prescript. The obligation
formulated with reference to the facts of our existence, and the con-
ditions of our existence, is already the bottom obligation ; there is
not a second bottom beneath it.
In that case Mr. Salter says, "your ethical commands are hy-
pothetical ; they are conditioned by the wish to be in harmony
with society; the wish to be in conformity with the conditions
of nature ; the wish for life."
Certainly, the ethical rules are in this sense conditioned ; for
all we can say about the ethical ought is to state the facts as they
are : the man who does not care for being a useful member of so-
ciety, or who does not care for his physical, mental and moral
health, who does not care for going to the wall and whose actions
are expressions of this indifference, he will do harm to his fellow-
beings and he will be doomed to perdition. His soul so far as it is
possible will be blotted out, and his life will become a curse to
humanity. These are the facts and the moral ought is a state-
ment of such and kindred facts for pastoral purposes, or as a help
for self- education.
Here, it appears, lies the ultimate divergency between Mr. Sal-
ter's view and our view. Mr. Salter finds, or believes he finds, an
obligation of absolute authority beyond facts and beyond the realm
of science. We cannot see that an obligation outside of the pro-
vince of positive facts, the obligation of an absolute authority has
any meaning.
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This ethical view will naturally appear to him who holds it,
deeper than positivism and broader than monism. To the monist
however it must appear dualistic, to the positivist metaphysical,
to the man of natural science, supernatural. The former stand-
point recognizes a profundity where the latter finds a vagary.
MUNERA PULVERIS.
BY JEFFERSON B. FLETCHER.
Luxury lives and love lies dead,
Pleasure is king and beauty fled,
Fled with the souls of ideals slain.
Slain by Cain and the sons of Cain.
For a pitiful pittance of shoddy show
The world's grown gray, and the world must grow.
O young men ! O maidens ! O children of pride !
From you beauty fled, for you love hath died :
Oh ! breathe on his frozen lips one kiss,
And the beautiful god will awake I wis.
And beauty come back from the dead world to this.
BOOK REVIEWS.
Races and Peoples : Lectures on the Science of Ethnography.
By Daniel G. Brinton, A. M., M. D., etc. New York : N. D.
C. Hodges. Chicago : A. C. McClurg & Co. 1890.
This well got-up volume, which is the outcome of a series of
lectures delivered by the author as professor of Ethnology at the
Academy of Natural Sciences, Philadelphia, was reviewed in The
Monist of October last. Although some of its chief conclusions
will not recommend themselves to the majority of anthropologists,
it presents an array of facts which are not to be found collected
elsewhere in so small a compass. The last chapter treats of Eth-
nograpJiic Problems and The Destiny of Raees. Dr. Brinton con-
cludes that while all other races are either dying out or are sta-
tionary. "The great white race is gradually extending its empire
over all continents and to the most distant islands." He is strongly
opposed to what is known as miscegenation, but he believes that
'
' when bigotry ceases on both sides, and free-marriage restores
the Aryo Semitic stock to its original unity, we may look for a
race of nobler capacities than any now e.xisting.
"
i2.
A Grateful Spirit and Other Sermons. By James I'ila Blake.
Chicago : i8go. Charles H. Kerr & Co.
It is not surprising that Mr. Blake was requested to publish
these sermons. They contain many suggestive thoughts and pious
reflections, clothed in language which makes them more readable
than the ordinary run of sermons. Much liberality of mind is ob-
servable throughout and it is pleasing to meet with a Christian min-
ister who can say, as does Mr, Blake, that he has found "great
delight, mental and moral glow, spiritual inspiration," in reading
the Scriptures of other religions besides the Hebrew and the Chris-
tian, finding in them the same moral and religious truths. Some
of the sermons, such as "At Peace with Things," " Faithfulness,"
and " Old Age," contain much that may be of service in aiding
the development of high moral culture. il.
Reminiscences. By Lucy N. Coleman. Buffalo, N. Y. : 1891. H.
L. Green.
The story of a life spent in the interests of truth and freedom,
and particularly in support of the anti-slavery agitation and in
furtherance of the abolition of ' 'Woman's Wrongs, " as expressed by
Mrs. Coleman. The Reminiscences are full of curious experiences,
not the least of which was the interview of the authoress with
President Lincoln, who avowed that he was not an Abolitionist,
and would not free the slaves if he could save the Union in any
other way: "He believed in the white race, not in the colored,
and did not want them put on an equality." The book contains
excellent portraits of Mrs. Coleman and of her friend Mrs. Amy
Post, a short notice of whose active life concludes the volume. 0.
NOTES.
We understand that the Brooklyn Ethical Association has re-
cently elected a number of Corresponding Members, resident in
different parts of this country, in England, France, and India. The
Association wishes to receive information, written or printed, upon
any of the following topics connected with its work: (i) As to the
location, organization, and work of other societies, clubs, or classes
with objects similar to its own
; (2) Information, bearing upon the
doctrine of Evolution, of its physical, biological, psychical, philo-
sophical, or ethical aspects
; (3) Information bearing upon the scien-
tific studyof Ethics
; (4) Information concerning practical methods
in applied Ethics—involving the questions of practical beneficence,
public and private charities, the moral training of the young, the
elevation of the ignorant and degraded, reforms in penal institu-
tions, hospitals, etc., the relations of capital and labor, the legal
status and education of women, social and governmental reforms,
etc., etc.: (5) Information bearing upon the scientific study of
Sociology, including the science and philosophy of Economics
:
6) Information bearing upon the scientific study of Comparative
Religion
; (7) Information as to the best methods of spreading and
Inculcating scientific and evolutionary doctrines as affecting ethical,
religious, and sociological problems, and especially as affecting the
practical daily life of women.
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